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THE IMPER ATIVE OF POLITIC AL NAVIGATION
India’s Strategy in the Indian Ocean and the Logic of Indo-U.S.
Strategic Partnership
Yogesh Joshi

W

hen in April 2021 USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53) conducted a freedomof-navigation operation (FONOP) in India’s exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), a section of India’s highly vocal strategic community erupted with indignation and criticism.1 Steeped in the precepts of nonalignment, these passionate
defenders of India’s strategic autonomy and modern purveyors of a Nehruvian
foreign policy accused the Seventh Fleet of violating India’s domestic law.2
The U.S. Navy (USN) actions raised significant doubts regarding India’s capability to safeguard its maritime interests.3 Some even argued that such FONOPs
diminished India’s credibility to deter China’s encroachment into India’s maritime zone of influence. After all, the legitimacy of India’s position hinged on an
equal application of the law to all, whether friend or foe.4 FONOPs challenged
two salient aspirations of Nehruvian foreign policy: Indian leadership of the
South Asian region and recognition of the same by other great powers. The
Indian government’s pallid response to this unwanted foray into the country’s
“sphere of influence” could signal to the region that New Delhi has forfeited its
leadership role to Washington.5 As one commentator argued, by “encouraging the
United States to assume a dominant role in South Asia, India might be on a path
to relinquish its security commitments in the neighborhood.”6
The furor the Nehruvians raised even rubbed
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order” in the Indo-Pacific differ substantially, but, as Admiral Arun Prakash
warned, instead of “deterring adversaries” FONOPs can “alienate friends” in the
Indo-Pacific.7 For Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan, the FONOP in India’s EEZ
reflected the propensity of the United States to “shoot itself in the foot,” considering the damage it had done to the otherwise rising trajectory of the bilateral
relationship.8 The incident, therefore, was construed as highly detrimental to the
Indo-U.S. strategic partnership.
As if these recriminations were not enough, the “breathtaking inanity” (as
Prakash had dubbed it) of the Seventh Fleet’s actions managed to resurrect yet
again the haunting memories of American gunboat diplomacy during the 1971
Bangladesh war, when President Nixon dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Bay
of Bengal in support of Pakistan. As Manish Tewari, a senior leader of the main
opposition party, the Indian National Congress, observed, “In the fiftieth year of
the creation of Bangladesh, to sail a Seventh Fleet vessel in defiance of Indian law
through our EEZ, and then advertise it is downright obtuse, if not intended to
send out a message to India and the larger Indo-Pacific region.”9
Therefore, at stake were not only India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
but also its prestige as a major regional power in the Indian Ocean and the future
of the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership.
Yet while the proponents of strategic autonomy and nonalignment within
the strategic community wanted the Indian government, led by the right-ofcenter Bharatiya Janata Party, to save India’s honor and defend its interests, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) merely conveyed concerns “regarding
this passage through our EEZ to the Government of USA through diplomatic
channels.”10 And Admiral Karambir Singh, the chief of naval staff, simultaneously
was declaring the capability and intentions of the Indian navy to coordinate and
interoperate with the navies of the other Quad countries, of which the United
States is one.11 Seemingly, the Indian government neither shared the humiliation
felt and expressed by the analytical community nor appeared to be concerned
over the purported violation of India’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, or domestic law—or, for that matter, its material interests and status concerns in the
Indian Ocean.
What can explain this dissonance between the positions of India’s highly vocal
Nehruvian strategic community and those of the Indian strategic establishment?
Or what explains “the enduring reluctance of Delhi’s foreign policy community,” as C. Raja Mohan puts it, to understand the praxis of Indian foreign and
national-security policy, both in the Indian Ocean and vis-à-vis its relations with
the United States?12
The question acquires additional importance when one considers the following facts. First, given that the U.S. Navy has conducted FONOPs in India’s EEZ
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/5
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regularly since 1992, successive Indian governments—of all ideological dispositions—can be considered complicit in not defending India’s interests and honor;
the absence of a firm response is not the policy of the current government alone.13
Second, the Indian government’s statement clearly outlined that even though
Washington had not notified New Delhi of the drill, the Indian navy “continuously monitored [USN ships] transiting from the Persian Gulf towards the Malacca Straits.”14 The FONOP was not conducted in secrecy. If the government had
wanted to do so, it could have raised the issue diplomatically; and, given how seriously it takes such violations even by friendly navies, it might have “challenged”
such navigation physically.15 Yet New Delhi was interested in doing neither.
The critics within the Indian strategic community fail to account for New
Delhi’s policies for four principal reasons. First, they underestimate the strength
of the realpolitik tradition in India’s foreign and security policies in the Indian
Ocean. Irrespective of the idealistic and normative overtones of India’s foreignpolicy pronouncements—whether on the presence of great-power navies in the
Indian Ocean, the question of the so-called Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP),
the matter of Diego Garcia, or, for that matter, the law of the sea—Indian foreign
policy always has been highly pragmatic.16 This pragmatism is engendered by an
acknowledgment of the incompatibility between the desirability and the feasibility of India’s preferred position, by a similar disconnect regarding attempts to use
normative arguments to secure India’s material interests, and also by the realization that today’s commitments could become tomorrow’s constraints. India’s strategic community regularly has underestimated New Delhi’s “capacity to rework
its great power relations to meet India’s changing interests and circumstances.”17
Second, those in this community misunderstand the relationship between international law and politics. Both the codification and the application of law are
determined by what is politically desirable, negotiable, and feasible in a particular
historical context. It is politics that determines how the law will be applied and, if
need be, altered, depending on the state’s interests. India’s Maritime Zones Act of
1976, which lays out India’s legal position on foreign military presence in the EEZ,
is also subject to the vagaries of the country’s political interests.18 In international
politics, the legal tail seldom wags the political dog.
Third, China’s rise as a great power in India’s immediate neighborhood has
shifted New Delhi’s motivation fundamentally toward a robust Indo-U.S. strategic
partnership. Even during the Cold War, India leveraged the great powers—both
the United States and the Soviet Union—to ensure that its security requirements
were met, yet while doing so it could continue to feign nonalignment because
both great powers were geographically distant in the maritime realm and had no
fundamental conflict of interest with India. The rise of China has changed India’s
geopolitical imperative. For the first time in the history of the Republic of India,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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it faces a hostile great power on its immediate borders. In the post–Cold War
period, India “bandwagoned” with the United States for economic and military
gains; today, however, the issues at stake are much more existential. Both Indian
political survival and the avoidance of Chinese hegemony in Asia necessitate a
closer alignment with the United States.
Last but not least is the lack of a deeper historical understanding of India’s
foreign-policy positions.19 Any immersive engagement with archival sources
reveals the inherent contradictions between India’s foreign-policy pronouncements and its practice, but in the absence of such careful study the analytical
community often has erred by taking India’s public declarations as representing
its intended policy and its foreign-policy principles as denoting the limits of
potential behavior.
However, extensive documentary evidence from Indian archives is now available. Using those resources, along with interviews with government officials, this
article aims to explain the above-mentioned dissonance between the students and
the practitioners of Indian security policy in the Indian Ocean, especially with
regard to the role of the United States in the region. It argues that, unlike those
making up a large section of the strategic community, which remains embedded in the Nehruvian rhetoric of nonalignment and strategic autonomy, India’s
foreign-policy mandarins and its national-security managers always have
adopted a realpolitik approach to security concerns in the Indian Ocean and the
involvement of great powers in the region. In doing so, the article also traces the
many twists and turns in the Indo-U.S. relationship and explains the current trajectory of the two nations’ burgeoning partnership in the Indian Ocean.
GREAT-POWER PRESENCE AND INDIA’S REALPOLITIK IN THE
INDIAN OCEAN
As India and China were engaged in a crisis over eastern Ladakh in July 2020, an
aircraft carrier strike group (CSG) led by USS Nimitz (CVN 68) under the U.S.
Navy’s Seventh Fleet transited through the Indian Ocean.20 Nimitz’s foray into the
Bay of Bengal and the ensuing passing exercise (known as a PASSEX) with warships from the Indian navy’s Eastern Naval Command hardly was accidental.21
Irrespective of whether Nimitz’s transit had any direct impact on Beijing’s calculations on the Sino-Indian crisis, it did help to ventilate emotions stirred up by
China’s heavy-handedness in the region. China should not commit the mistake
of “underestimating the strength of free democracies,” warned then–U.S. Defense
Secretary Mark T. Esper.22
However, the significance of Nimitz’s passage through the Indian Ocean
was far greater. The Seventh Fleet finally had “eclipsed” the emotional baggage
weighing on Indo-American relations owing to its past actions.23 In December
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/5
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India gains independence, Indian navy established

1958

UNCLOS I held

1960

UNCLOS II held

1962

First assistance to India by USN CSG, during India-China
war

1963

U.S. extends operational area of Seventh Fleet to include
Indian Ocean; U.S. and India sign port visit MOU

1964

China explodes first nuclear device

1966–69

Britain withdraws naval forces from east of Suez

1967

India extends territorial sea claim to twelve miles

1971

U.S. begins rapprochement with China

1971

Bangladesh war partitions Pakistan; India intervenes in Bangladesh; USS Enterprise CSG enters Bay of Bengal, attempting
to coerce cessation

1971

India and USSR conclude treaty of friendship

1971

IOZP proposed in UN General Assembly

1973–82

UNCLOS III held

1974–76

USN aircraft buzz Indian navy ships

1977

India’s Maritime Zones Act goes into effect

1982

UNCLOS completed and ratification begins
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1986, 1988 India intervenes in Seychelles/Maldives
1989–92

End of Cold War and USSR

1992

First Exercise Malabar held, between U.S. and India in
Indian Ocean

1992

USN begins regular FONOPs in India’s prospective EEZ

1995

India ratifies and issues declaration on UNCLOS

2007

India, U.S., Japan, and Australia establish the Quad and
hold Exercise Malabar-2007 in Bay of Bengal; China
protests

2010–13

The Quad quiescent

2013

India scuttles U.S.-Maldives agreement

2014

PLAN nuclear submarine transits Indian Ocean en route to
Pakistan

2017

Members agree to revive Quad

2019

Indian navy forces PLAN research vessel to depart Andaman Sea

2020

Galwan / eastern Ladakh crisis between India and China;
USS Nimitz CSG conducts PASSEX with Indian navy in Bay
of Bengal

2020

India fosters U.S.-Maldives agreement

2021

USS John Paul Jones CSG conducts FONOP in India’s EEZ

Notes: CSG = carrier strike group; EEZ = exclusive economic zone; FONOP = freedomof-navigation operation; IOZP = Indian Ocean Zone of Peace; MOU = memorandum of
understanding; PASSEX = passing exercise; PLAN = People’s Liberation Army Navy (China);
UNCLOS = UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; UNCLOS I, II, III = First, Second, Third
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea; USN = U.S. Navy; USSR = Soviet Union
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1971, President Richard M. Nixon ordered USS Enterprise (CVN 65) to sail
into the Bay of Bengal to coerce India to cease its intervention in Bangladesh.24
Nixon’s gunboat diplomacy could not stop Pakistan’s dismemberment; however, ever since then the Seventh Fleet has retained an infamous reputation
in India’s strategic consciousness. Nixon’s actions ensured that New Delhi remained both disagreeable and distrustful regarding any U.S. military presence
in the Indian Ocean. And in the post–Cold War period, the incident has provided the reference point for domestic opposition to the strengthening IndoU.S. strategic partnership. In this context, the show of solidarity by the Nimitz
CSG during the Galwan crisis was perceived not merely as an act of support
for India’s resistance to China but also as granting the Seventh Fleet absolution
for the sins committed in December 1971. Even so, against the backdrop of the
recent FONOPs, comparisons to the 1971 Enterprise incident were back in vogue.
For the domestic critics of the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership, Nixon’s gunboat
diplomacy remains the gift that simply keeps on giving.
However, considering December 1971 to be the reference point for the Seventh Fleet’s entry into the Indian Ocean—and India’s strategic memory—is erroneous. The Seventh Fleet first was ordered to the Indian Ocean by President John
F. Kennedy in November 1962, in response to an explicit request from Indian
prime minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to provide air support against Communist China.25 On receiving Nehru’s request for assistance, the “aircraft carrier
[USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63)] of the Seventh Fleet was detailed to steam at full speed
for the Bay of Bengal.”26 However, the war ended before the Seventh Fleet units
could arrive in the region.
Although this was the first time since independence that India had welcomed
American intervention in the region, the presence of friendly great powers in
the Indian Ocean on which New Delhi could bandwagon for the sake of Indian
maritime security was part and parcel of the government’s security policy in the
Indian Ocean from the very beginning.27 In August 1947, the Royal Indian Navy
prepared its first planning paper for postindependence India. For Naval Headquarters in New Delhi, “a navy commanding the respect of the world” was not
a “luxury” but an “essential” prerequisite for “pre-eminence and leadership” in
South and Southeast Asia and for maintaining its “position in world strategy as
the focal country of the Indian Ocean.” The navy’s outlook was driven by a Mahanian vision of the service’s role in India’s future wars and the country’s aspiration to
take over the British mantle in the Indian Ocean; India’s maritime security could
be achieved best by “destroying or neutralising the enemy naval forces and by
ensuring that enemy shipping is deprived [of] the use of the seas.”28
The plan prepared by Naval Headquarters was one of the most ambitious in the
entire Third World; it also was detached entirely from India’s political, economic,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/5
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and strategic realities. Politically, Indian decision makers neither shared the navy’s
vision of India’s strategic objectives nor appreciated the role of the navy in India’s
military strategy. Skeptical of the claims that India would become a significant
military power in the next decade, Nehru limited the country’s military objectives to ensuring “internal and frontier security.” For such limited aims, India
required “land forces not greater than the pre-war level,” and of course “the air
forces,” which Nehru saw as the “most efficient weapon” for “immediate action”
against any external “aggression.”29 The navy did not fit into Nehru’s vision for the
future of India’s armed forces, mainly owing to the absence of any specific maritime threat and the presence of friendly great powers in the Indian Ocean. British
military strategists such as Patrick M. S. Blackett, to whom Nehru often turned
for advice regarding India’s defense requirements and posture, reinforced this
belief. In a top secret report submitted to the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD)
in September 1948, Blackett argued that the Indian navy should “look after the
coastal and local defences, and the escort of convoys in the Indian Ocean, leaving
the major fighting units to be provided by the great powers.”30
It also was easy for New Delhi to adopt a “cryptic,” or unstated, bandwagoning
strategy because there were only minimal associated costs to pay. In public, Nehru continued to oppose any great-power presence in the Indian Ocean; proclaim
the policy of nonalignment; and refuse to sanction explicit security cooperation
with the British and the Americans, not only because of their existing presence in
the region, but also owing to a belief that, if need be, they would come to India’s
aid anyway. Nehru, therefore, rejected any explicit defense talks with the British
and the idea of a Commonwealth security pact. However, the inherent dichotomy
in India’s nonalignment policy—that the political leadership in New Delhi considered India “too important to be a junior partner in a military alliance yet too
weak to be left alone to its resources”—was captured in Nehru’s defense minister
Baldev Singh’s reassurance to the British that, irrespective of the Indian prime
minister’s public position, “his colleagues in the cabinet fully realise that India
cannot stand alone in defence matters.”31 Therefore, in the postindependence
period India chose to bandwagon on the dominant Western naval forces instead
of developing itself into an independent naval power. However, the perceived
absence of maritime threats was reassuring only in a context in which no threat
could materialize from over the horizon, given the dominance of Western naval
forces in the Indian Ocean.
India’s dichotomous approach toward Western naval powers in the region also
was evident in the positions its government took during the first United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, in 1958. India’s diplomatic position was torn
between its cryptic bandwagoning strategy and its public rhetoric supporting
Third World solidarity and sovereignty. On three major dimensions of the debate
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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during the 1958 conference, India opted for a course closer to that of the Western states than of its Third World colleagues. The first concerned the expansion
of the limits of territorial seas from three to twelve nautical miles. The second
pertained to the right of innocent passage and the requirement for “authorisation
and/or notification” by foreign warships sailing through the territorial seas. The
third concerned the rights of coastal states in the contiguous zone adjoining the
territorial seas, and the status of those waters as high seas.
Whereas the major maritime powers, led by the United States, wanted to limit
the extent of territorial seas to three nautical miles, many Latin American and
Afro-Asian countries wanted to assert their sovereignty to twelve nautical miles,
and even beyond.32 The Soviet Union had lobbied vigorously for the new limits,
as they would complicate the projection of naval power by the Western maritime
powers. India, however, supported a compromise advanced by the United States
and Britain to limit the extent of territorial seas to six nautical miles. Although
the compromise solution was defeated by a narrow margin and none other could
be agreed on under the 1958 convention, President Dwight D. Eisenhower fulsomely stated American appreciation for India’s position, asserting that it was
owing only to that country’s “gratifying support” that “such a proposal came close
to adoption at the last conference.”33
On the question of innocent passage, during the deliberations at the 1958
Geneva summit India supported the requirement for “authorisation [of] and/
or notification [by]” foreign warships and commercial ships passing through
a state’s territorial waters. Scholars have claimed that this was India’s position,
and that it was one of the primary reasons for the government’s nonsignature.34
However, archival documents now available indicate that both the MoD and
the MEA instead had recommended signing the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which required only notification, not
authorization. The Indian government delayed taking a firm position on this
requirement even after the 1958 convention. This was both because “they [the
conventions] were incomplete” and because the forthcoming second conference, in 1960, could look at these “unsettled questions,” so there was no need
to sign the conventions “in haste.”35 Moreover, during the deliberations in
Geneva the Indian representative had urged caution on the drafters regarding
some of the provisions sought by other developing countries, arguing that “the
coastal state could not act with impunity” to restrict innocent passage, as any
such “suspension” had to be “bonafide,” and the “burden of proof ” lay with
the coastal state.
Lastly, India also argued against extending the full rights of the coastal state
to the contiguous zone. The government held that “the contiguous zone was not
part of the territorial sea of the coastal state.”36
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/5
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One of the main reasons for this alignment closer to the Western states during
the Geneva conference was the fear of misuse of territorial seas by both adversaries and other coastal states. India’s MEA reasoned that many developing states
with very few naval resources would not be able to shoulder the responsibility “to
prevent any violation of their territorial sea by other states, particularly in wartime when the territorial waters of the neutral states could give refuge to unscrupulous belligerents.” Second, even though “innocent passage” through territorial
waters might be codified in law, “different states interpret these rights differently,”
which might lead to “considerable harassment” of foreign ships sailing through a
state’s waters. Lastly, extending the territorial seas to twelve nautical miles would
incorporate many areas of the high seas into national jurisdictions. This was
particularly problematic for crucial international waterways such as the Red Sea
and Strait of Malacca, “which would remain high seas under a 6-mile width” but
“would become closed by an extension of territorial waters to 12 miles.” For the
MEA, the “fears of harassment” in connection with Indonesian claims along the
Strait of Malacca, which historically have become more vociferous during internal troubles in the country, were of particular concern.37
New Delhi demurred from signing any of the four proffered conventions or
the optional protocol, even though all the ministries concerned—Defence, External Affairs, Agriculture, and Law—“recommended signatures without reservations.” Even Nehru had assured Eisenhower, during the president’s trip to India
in 1959, of India’s support in the forthcoming second conference, in 1960.38 This
(negative) action was taken largely because of the blowback received from the
Soviet Union and Afro-Asian countries, and the criticism the 1958 document
received from Nehru’s newly appointed—and influential—defense minister,
V. K. Krishna Menon. As Menon wrote to Nehru, “in this battle between haves and
have-nots,” India’s position should not constitute a “considerable departure” from
our policy of not “lining up with the power alignment with the powerful nations
[sic].” Menon built his central thesis on the assumption that the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) process supported the interests of major maritime
powers and was not in the long-term interests of a large coastal state such as India.39
As we will see in the next section, India’s rise as a naval power in the 1970s
and ’80s fundamentally contradicted Menon’s thesis; however, during the 1960s
India’s approach to UNCLOS remained ambivalent. India neither created a
domestic law to assert its sovereignty within its territorial seas nor extended its
territorial seas to twelve nautical miles (until 1967, as a reaction to Pakistani
claims), in contrast to the actions of many other Afro-Asian and Latin American
states. As one scholar of India’s international legal practice has argued, “India,
unlike [with] disarmament and other regimes, at various junctures, maintained
a low profile in the Law of Sea Convention negotiations because its interests in
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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freedom of navigation and security were identical to the interests of the major
maritime powers.”40
Yet to come to this realization entirely, India still had to experience the trauma
of defeat at the hands of China and the exultation of victory at Pakistan’s expense.
As Srinath Raghavan has argued, Nehru’s unfounded realism—the belief that the
great powers would not let India fall by the wayside even without security commitments—came crashing down during the Sino-Indian border war of 1962.41 If
New Delhi’s strategy of bandwagoning with friendly great powers in the Indian
Ocean had been driven earlier by an assessment of their interests and of India’s
place in the Cold War, the China threat, along with the emergence of the Pakistani and Indonesian navies, lent a sense of desperation to India’s perception of
its security requirements in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, when in December
1963 Washington formally announced its decision to “extend the operational
area of the Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean,” Nehru welcomed American ships
to Indian ports gladly.42 India and the United States also signed a memorandum
of understanding that facilitated visits by USN warships to Indian ports every six
months.43 By 1964, when China conducted its first nuclear test, India’s security
reliance on the U.S. Navy extended from conventional deterrence even to nuclear
deterrence. The presence of nuclear-weapons-capable U.S. ships and submarines
was construed as providing an implicit nuclear deterrent and was perceived as
reassurance vis-à-vis India’s hostile Himalayan neighbor.44
Even so, New Delhi could not support the U.S. presence explicitly, in public,
for three reasons.45 First, it needed to retain a semblance of the nonaligned foreign policy it supposedly shared with its Third World colleagues. Second, China
already had started canvassing for a more significant role in Indian Ocean politics
by championing the cause of anti-imperialism in the region. Not only did the issue of foreign military bases rankle within the domestic politics of Indian Ocean
states; it also provided fertile ground for Maoist revolutionary ideas exported into
Afro-Asia.46 Lastly, Moscow had warned New Delhi against providing any justification for the “US to consolidate its nuclear presence in the Indian Ocean area
on the pretext of offering nuclear protection to India [and other countries].”47
In private, however, New Delhi not only encouraged the U.S. Navy to bolster
its presence in the region; it also rejected the suggestions of Afro-Asian countries
to oppose actively the movements of USN ships within the Indian Ocean.48 As
L. K. Jha, principal secretary to India’s second prime minister, L. B. Shastri, advised in a top secret note of March 1965, even when the “Afro-Asian powers are
averse to the idea of nuclear weapons being carried in the Ocean close to their
borders,” India has to “live with a hostile nuclear power on its borders.” For India,
therefore, it was “difficult” to be “equally averse to movements of nuclear weapons
of Powers more friendly to us in the Indian Ocean.”49 Y. D. Gundevia, India’s then
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/5
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foreign secretary, took a similar position on the issue of the U.S. military base
on Diego Garcia, a British-controlled island in the Indian Ocean. In a strongly
worded memo, he argued against those of his colleagues favoring more-robust
opposition against the U.S. base: “If Mrs. Bhandaranaike shouts about Chagos
because it is nearer to Ceylon than Lop Nor; the same argument must apply, in
reverse, to Lop Nor, which is a slap across our northern borders. We cannot talk
about islands in the Indian Ocean, without condemning Chinese Nuclear land
bases, nearer to our borders; and if our friends want us to join in the howl against
Indian Ocean bases, we must expect them to not remain silent on the Chinese
nuclear bases, much closer to us.”50
For many in India, the Diego Garcia base and the subsequent stationing of
Polaris submarines in the Indian Ocean reflected a joint Western understanding
to provide a nuclear umbrella against the Chinese.51 Rather than reeking of antiAmericanism, India’s approach to the Indian Ocean was premised principally on
bandwagoning with the great powers.
The policy of cryptic bandwagoning continued even after the British withdrawal from the Indian Ocean. Britain’s 1966 defense white paper recommended
relocating British naval assets then operating east of Suez. As the British prepared
to leave the Indian Ocean in the late 1960s, the Indian navy feared that hostile
powers would try to gain a toehold in the Indian Ocean. The British move motivated the Indian naval staff to argue a “vacuum of maritime power” theory: that
in the face of British withdrawal inimical forces would take over custody of the
Indian Ocean. The concern was whether the vacuum the British left would allow
China to “extend her influence” by cooperating with Pakistan in the region.52 Not
without reason, therefore, Indian naval chief Admiral A. K. Chatterji suggested a
forward naval policy in the Indian Ocean, including the establishment of a fueling base in Mauritius.53
Indian decision makers, however, were not in favor of extending India’s
sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, as far as deterring China was
concerned, the presence of great powers in the Indian Ocean remained highly
reassuring. As a top secret assessment emanating from Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi’s office in April 1970 stated, “[J]ust as nobody in India can be certain that
the United States would use its nuclear weapons against China in the event of a
Chinese threat to India, nobody in China can be certain that the United States, in
fact, will not use its nuclear weapons against her.”54 U.S. naval operations in the
Indian Ocean buttressed India’s perceptual deterrence vis-à-vis China. Therefore,
Indian decision makers ignored the Indian navy’s call to fill the power vacuum
the British left in the Indian Ocean; the quest to balance China’s conventional and
nuclear threat dominated India’s approach to the Indian Ocean, and the presence
of great powers provided a cheaper policy alternative.
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As the historical narrative offered above shows, India’s first encounters with
the Seventh Fleet, or more broadly with great powers such as the United States in
the Indian Ocean, hardly can be characterized uniformly by feelings of anxiety,
insecurity, humiliation, and distrust; rather, it reveals how New Delhi early on
actually came to love the Seventh Fleet and the U.S. naval presence. Post-1971
sentimentalities notwithstanding, the relationship between India and the U.S.
Navy (and Britain’s Royal Navy before that) was one of “friends with benefits,”
so to speak. The American presence in the Indian Ocean and in the larger IndoPacific region serves a similar purpose today.
THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE FREEDOM OF
POLITICAL NAVIGATION
India’s strategy in the Indian Ocean during the 1960s suffered from the basic
weakness of any bandwagoning approach: What should the bandwagoner do if
the great power turns hostile? President Nixon’s embrace of China to outflank
the Soviet Union in the bipolar contest of the Cold War created a dilemma for
India. As a top secret MEA report in February 1970 stated, “[E]stablishment of a
working relationship between USA and China is likely to work to our detriment,
politically and economically.”55 Whereas India had banked on an implicit U.S., or
at least U.S.-sponsored, deterrent vis-à-vis China, by early 1971 Washington had
conveyed to New Delhi that “if the Chinese were to come to Pakistan’s assistance
in an attack on India, the U.S. would not find it possible to help us.” With one
superpower turning hostile (or at least less supportive), India’s cryptic bandwagoning strategy had to give way; New Delhi instead signed an Indo-Soviet treaty
in August 1971. As India’s ambassador to the United States told U.S. Secretary of
State William P. Rogers, nonalignment does not mean that “in facing aggression
and/or threats of aggression, we will be alone and single-handed.”56
The 1971 war with Pakistan over the creation of Bangladesh resulted in contradictory impulses, of both exultation and anxiety. First, it entrenched a belief
of regional supremacy, or at least an aspiration toward it, in New Delhi. The war
laid the ideological, if not the material, edifice of India’s equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine.57 However, the previously discussed actions of the Seventh Fleet
toward the end of the war left a distinct impression of vulnerability on the Indian
psyche. Henceforth, the aspiration to establish the country’s supremacy within
the region and reduce its vulnerability against extraregional powers drove India’s
approach to the Indian Ocean. Given the country’s lack of material resources,
the tools of diplomacy, law, and morality became India’s primary instruments to
achieve its interests in the region.
The impact of this policy imperative first became evident in India’s approach
to the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace.58 If India earlier had conspired against its
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/5
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fellow nonaligned states silently, now it led that opposition from the front. As new
archival research shows, “[h]olding the Great Powers responsible solely for IOR’s
[Indian Ocean region’s] militarization and restricting the IOZP from addressing
any local imbalances of power assured that India’s regional primacy, achieved in
the aftermath of the 1971 war, would remain intact.”59 The same was true for India’s
position on Diego Garcia. In the 1960s, Indian diplomats had promised their British counterparts that the “Indian government did not propose to push their protest
[regarding the Anglo-American understanding on Diego Garcia] beyond a formal
objection. British base in the Indian Ocean might well in the long term be of advantage to India.”60 However, the change in India’s political circumstances transformed
what once may have been perceived as a security asset into a manifest threat.
Therefore, India’s approach to the evolving legal regime on the law of the
sea in the 1970s cannot be divorced from India’s political-strategic imperatives.
And, as in the cases of both the IOZP and Diego Garcia, India’s position on freedom of navigation in the EEZ was driven by two competing logics: power and
vulnerability.
In South Asia, India was one of the first states to endorse openly the EEZ
provision in the draft UNCLOS. With a total of 587,600 square nautical miles
in its nascent EEZ, India would be one of the top beneficiaries of the emerging
resource jurisdiction in the high seas. The discovery in the early 1970s of oil resources off the coast of Bombay and technological breakthroughs in seabed mining only heightened India’s interest in the concept. As was the case everywhere
else in the developing world, the fundamental impulse to claim an Indian EEZ
was “resource-oriented.”61
However, the motivation to claim EEZs was not purely economic. Like the rest
of the Third World, India was equally enthused by the prospect that the global
political-legal trend on EEZs might help extend the territorial sovereignty of
coastal states into the high seas. For India, such an extension of territorial jurisdiction could engender new “psycho-legal boundaries” against the military presence of hostile great powers in the Indian Ocean.62 As Elizabeth Young argued in
a 1974 article, “The great navies will find their traditional roaming of the open
seas, ‘showing the flag’ in their nation’s interest, constrained, psychologically
where not physically, by the multitude of new jurisdictional boundaries.”63 In the
face of material constraints on India’s naval power, the law of the sea provided a
perfect combination of diplomacy, legality, and morality for New Delhi to use to
achieve its immediate objectives in the region.
A concrete example of such thinking within the Indian establishment is available in a top secret note made by the Legal Treaties Division of the MEA in July
1976.64 Between 1974 and 1976, several incidents occurred in which Indian navy
ships were buzzed and harassed by USN aircraft on what were then the high seas
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of the Indian Ocean, but which prospectively would fall within the Indian EEZ
under UNCLOS.65 The MoD requested that the MEA take up the matter with the
American embassy in New Delhi, but it also sought a legal opinion on “whether
such acts of snooping and buzzing by the US Aircraft amount to a violation of
rights of the Indian Navy to conduct its operations on the high seas or any right
it may have in this regard.”
In the event, although India communicated its concerns to the U.S. embassy,
the foreign secretary cautioned the MoD that “New Delhi should not make much
of an issue.”66 The MEA believed that unnecessary publicity of these events could
create a political crisis for the government and “put a strain” on bilateral IndoU.S. relations.67
Second—and more interestingly—the MEA believed that U.S. actions did not
violate any international law. As the Legal Treaties Division explained, the 1958
Geneva Convention on the High Seas “allows such action under the freedom of
the high seas.” Furthermore, the note accepted that “even in the context of current negotiations on the law of the sea, the freedom of navigation and freedom to
fly over the oceans beyond the limits of the territorial sea are unchallenged.” The
issue, therefore, was not a matter of legal rights—which were nonexistent—but
of avoiding serious accidents on the high seas. Therefore, the practical solution
was to subject the interactions between the two navies to standards similar to
those the Soviet Union and United States had negotiated in their agreement on
the prevention of incidents on the high seas.68 Looking to the future, however, the
division pointed out that the ongoing negotiations in the United Nations could
create new legal boundaries to the U.S. presence in India’s adjacent high seas:
“[I]f these incidents occur in the maritime areas over which” India could gain
“sovereignty or sovereign rights or special rights, they may be regarded as interference with or violation of our rights thereunder.”69
India’s interests and expectations concerning the ongoing negotiations on the law
of the sea were principally responsible for the enactment—even before UNCLOS
was negotiated fully—of its domestic law on the subject, the previously mentioned
Maritime Zones Act of 1976. As one of the Indian negotiators of UNCLOS has argued, the act was “umbrella legislation” that asserted India’s claims in anticipation of
their acceptance at the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).70
Thus, the domestic law prefigured, rather than followed, the international treaty on
the law of the sea. The law laid out the maximum extent of India’s interests—not its
obligations—projected to flow from the conclusion of the 1982 treaty, UNCLOS.
When the domestic law came into effect in 1977, India also created a police force—
the Indian Coast Guard—to implement its domestic laws in its EEZ.
The terms of the Maritime Zones Act not only required any foreign warships
to provide prior notification of movement in India’s EEZ; it also declared that the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/5
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government of India could restrict or regulate freedom of navigation in “designated areas” of its EEZ if deemed necessary in the “interests of the peace, good
order, or security of India.”71 Prima facie, both of these provisions in domestic law
were in contravention of the customary law of freedom of navigation on the high
seas. During the negotiation of UNCLOS India’s appeal to have these provisions
accepted was rejected, and the final version of UNCLOS upheld the freedom of
navigation of foreign warships.
Considering the final treaty terms, O. P. Sharma argues that “India had an obligation to modify [its relevant domestic legislation] after India formally ratified
the treaty.”72 However, once India had codified its maximalist position in domestic law it could not revise it without entailing high political costs for the government. Thus, democratic politics ensured that India would remain in violation
of its treaty commitments. The legal incompatibility between India’s domestic
law and its international treaty commitments can be traced easily to resource
nationalism, ideological adherence to Third World solidarity, and a belief that the
momentum of global politics was shifting in favor of the nonaligned.
However, India’s policy position was driven equally by the imperative to reduce
the country’s vulnerability to political intimidation by hostile great powers and
the aspiration to establish its regional supremacy. The overall strategic context
within which India conducted, and continues to conduct, its legal maneuverings
is vital to understanding why the Indian government has remained relatively silent on the presence of foreign navies in the Indian Ocean in general and the issue
of FONOPs in particular. While reducing the country’s vulnerability to political
intimidation by hostile great powers may have been India’s immediate interest,
its own longtime goal of establishing regional supremacy would necessitate its
rise as a naval power. These contradictory interests played out both in the debate
surrounding the enactment of the Maritime Zones Act of 1976 and in the act’s
subsequent implementation. India may have been materially weak, but it aspired
to be a great power, so insofar as today’s legal commitments could become tomorrow’s constraints, India had to tread carefully; the possibility that it someday
might become a significant naval power could shift the balance of India’s interests
closer to those of the established maritime powers. Such a possibility was given
due recognition within both the MEA and the MoD. The top secret assessment
made by the Legal Treaties Division in 1976 mentioned the Indian navy’s “right to
navigation” and the right to “exercise of freedom of navigation” on the high seas.73
However, the emergence of the EEZ regime created complications for the Indian navy vis-à-vis its smaller littoral neighbors in the Indian Ocean. If India used
the logic of the law to restrict great-power presence in its surrounding waters,
the smaller states could request that New Delhi extend them the same courtesy.
Moreover, while a state with a mediocre navy could ignore these restrictions, the
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situation could become a headache once that state achieved maritime greatness,
as India aimed to accomplish eventually. The MoD’s view soon was validated;
during the mid-1970s, Bangladesh, Myanmar (Burma), Pakistan, and Sri Lanka
enacted maritime laws requiring prior consent, resulting in restrictions on India’s
maneuverability within the region.74 For example, even though India offered a
reciprocal requirement of notification for the movement of both Indian and Sri
Lankan warships in the Palk Strait, Sri Lanka continuously has demanded that
India acquire consent for the movement of its warships.75 Moreover, Malaysia
and Indonesia could use the new construct of international law, in the form of
UNCLOS, to claim sovereignty over major navigational choke points such as the
Malacca Strait.
These concerns were incorporated into India’s domestic law, its negotiating
strategy in the UNCLOS conference, and the implementation of its domestic
maritime law regarding the presence of foreign navies in its EEZ. First, as was
discussed earlier, during the first law-of-the-sea conference, held in Geneva in
1958, India had gone along with the rest of the Third World, insisting on both
notification and authorization for the passage of foreign warships through a
state’s territorial waters.76 However, the provision was defeated at the insistence
of the major maritime powers. As New Delhi prepared to participate in negotiations for UNCLOS III, it confronted a dilemma regarding the passage of foreign
warships through its EEZ. Given the growth of Indian naval power during the
interim, the country’s material situation had changed significantly since 1958.
Therefore, unlike in 1958, on the advice of the MoD, New Delhi dropped its
support for requiring consent. This change in India’s position was motivated
primarily by the prospect of the country’s maritime rise and its possible future
naval operations in other countries’ EEZs. As O. P. Sharma explains, “On the eve
of the convening of the UNCLOS III, an in-depth examination of this issue [i.e.,
authorization and notification] was carried out by the Ministry of Defence and
it was concluded that India, being herself a growing maritime power, should not
insist on the requirement of prior authorization but should support only the less
restrictive requirement of prior notification.”77 Thus, India’s approach was driven
neither by legalism nor by notions of right and wrong; New Delhi was trying to
juggle its immediate against its prospective political interests. India’s immediate
interests supported the notion of mare clausum; its prospective rise required
mare liberum. The thinking within the establishment was relatively straightforward: because India’s interests and power might shift, today’s legal commitments
should not become tomorrow’s constraints.
Therefore, as Indian naval capabilities grew, the MoD’s insistence on demanding a “less restrictive requirement” from foreign navies also gained greater currency in India’s approach.78 If the 1976 act requires consent by all foreign warships
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to “enter and pass through” India’s EEZ, India’s 1995 declaration on the subject
simply states an “understanding” that the “provisions of the Convention do not
authorize other States to carry out in the exclusive economic zone and on the
continental shelf military exercises or manoeuvres, in particular those involving the use of weapons or explosives, without the consent of the coastal state.”79
The 1995 declaration is less restrictive than the 1976 act in two ways. First, as
Commodore Lalit Kapur points out, India’s interpretation of UNCLOS does
not result in a legal obligation: “An understanding is not a requirement. . . .
India has never sought to enforce this understanding against any USN ships.”80
Second, from the “all foreign warships” addressed under the 1976 act, the 1995
declaration pulls back to target only those involved in “military exercises or
manoeuvres.” The shift creates a higher bar before Indian law can be applied to
the presence of foreign warships, and it creates a distinction between navies that
India may perceive to be friendly and those it deems hostile to its interests.81 The
declaration concerning India’s position on foreign warships in EEZs represents
an evolution toward greater support for, rather than restrictions on, freedom of
navigation on the high seas. Just as politics rather than law guided India’s behavior on the law of the sea in the 1970s, it has continued to do so since then.
Second, similar reasoning applied to India’s position on major navigational
pathways or choke points, such as the Malacca Strait. Given the general trend in
the UNCLOS progression toward extending the limits of territorial sovereignty
into what had been the high seas, “creeping territorial sea[s]” threatened to restrict the “access of warships through straits used for international navigation
where passage had previously been free.”82 The extension of territorial seas to
twelve nautical miles may have allowed countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia
to challenge the status of the Malacca Strait as a high-seas corridor and thereby
claim sovereignty over it. This was one of the principal worries of the Indian establishment even during the 1958 Geneva conference. Among India’s fundamental interests in Southeast Asia, as a secret report prepared by the MEA argued in
February 1976, was that the “Malacca straits remain free and open to the Indian
Navy.”83 India, therefore, agreed with the major maritime powers over the incorporation into UNCLOS of a new regime of “unimpeded transit passage,” which
was an improvement over the earlier right of “innocent passage” in the territorial
seas. It is enshrined in article 38(2) of the 1982 UNCLOS treaty.
Third, India’s realpolitik also was visible in its implementation of its domestic laws in its EEZ. Even though the Maritime Zones Act of 1976 claimed for
India the right to close parts of its EEZs to foreign warships, New Delhi never
has implemented the law in practice. It hardly ever has declared any special
or designated areas as being out of bounds to navigation by foreign warships.
Instead, to protect its offshore oil installations, it has declared “cautionary
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zones” in which foreign navies could submit voluntarily to regulation of their
movements.84 As one official from India’s National Security Council argued
in an interview, “[T]he Navy has seldom employed coercive measures against
foreign navies transiting or operating through India’s EEZs.”85 The only public
account of the Indian navy physically challenging a foreign navy ship relates
to an incident of November 2019, when the People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN) oceanic research vessel Shi Yan–1 was forced to leave the Andaman
Sea. The Indian navy justified its actions by declaring that the activities of Shi
Yan–1 violated India’s 1995 declaration. “EEZs are international waters, but if
we find Chinese ships engaging in what we perceive to be military manoeuvres,
we chase them away.”86 Perception, not the letter of the law, is the most critical
element of India’s practice.
Some Indian analysts have called out India for its legal hypocrisy in differentiating between USN ships and PLAN ships operating in India’s EEZ.87 This
criticism is mistaken, for two reasons. First, accepting either the letter of India’s
domestic law or its declaration of reservations on the eve of its ratification of
UNCLOS in 1995 as being the “gospel truth” of India’s position would be highly
erroneous. As the discussion above underlines, the question of foreign warships
in India’s EEZ was never about legalities but about political interests. Today,
India’s political interests align with those of the United States and clash with
China’s. U.S. naval movement in the Indian Ocean does not threaten India’s interests, whereas the PLAN constitutes the Indian navy’s primary challenge. Second,
India’s domestic law leaves enough space for Indian decision makers to make a
judgment on the intent of foreign warships transiting through or operating in
the Indian Ocean. The law allows for the benign passage of ships not involved in
hostile military exercises or maneuvers—and the distinction between benign and
hostile intentions is the result of a political, not a legal, determination.
In the end, how India implements its laws depends primarily on two factors:
whether it is interested in physically challenging those who technically may be
in violation of its domestic laws, and whether it has the power to do so. As to the
first, India has no interest in stopping the Americans, and it has every reason to
challenge the PLAN in its back yard.
However, as to the second: If a state lacks the capacity to surveil the high seas
and physically to escort violators out of its EEZ, regurgitating legalities is futile.
For India to take such action, it first must develop the requisite capability to
establish maritime domain awareness so it can identify violations, and it must
build enough naval muscle to be able to challenge the perpetrators thereafter.
Until India has both capabilities, the law is meaningless. This was evident in
2014 when a Chinese nuclear submarine transited through the Indian Ocean on
its way to the Pakistani port of Gwadar. Chinese authorities did notify the Indian
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defense attaché in Beijing, but only after the passage had been completed.88 In any
case, India would be foolish to believe that China will be deterred from conducting naval movements in the Indian Ocean simply because India holds a certain
interpretation of its own law. China will do what is in its best interests, and it will
be deterred only by India’s military capacity to safeguard its interests and enforce
its version of the law. The capability to perform the latter is augmented greatly by
India’s close military cooperation with the United States. India’s balance of interests dictates that the passage of USS John Paul Jones be seen merely as a tempest
in a teapot rather than a major crisis in Indo-U.S. relations.
The history of India’s legal positioning during the UNCLOS negotiations, the
process of enacting its domestic laws, and the way it implements those laws all
attest to the fact that Indian decision makers never have allowed the legal tail to
wag the political dog. Notwithstanding anyone’s idealistic perceptions of Indian
foreign policy, the country has a tradition of safeguarding its interests in the Indian Ocean through the practice of realpolitik. Because India is lacking in material power, New Delhi at different times has employed diplomacy, law, and norms
to attempt to secure its interests; however, the Indian government seldom could
be accused of remaining blind to the fundamental forces of international politics:
power and interests. The same logic drives India’s contemporary approach to the
Indian Ocean and the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership.
EYE ON THE DRAGON AND THE LARGER DYNAMICS OF
INDO-U.S. RELATIONS
By the mid-1980s, New Delhi had become convinced that the side India had
chosen in the Cold War superpower rivalry between the United States and the
Soviet Union (i.e., the latter) was “declining.”89 There also was a realization that
even though “India’s relations with the US have fluctuated from time to time” and
“US foreign and strategic objectives have often militated against India’s security
concerns in South Asia and the Indian Ocean,” the two countries’ interests were
complementary enough to achieve a “mutually beneficial relationship.”90 The rise
of the Indian navy as the region’s preeminent naval force also enticed the Americans to work with the Indians once again. Not without reason, therefore, naval
cooperation in the Indian Ocean was deemed to be one of the most promising
avenues for productive Indo-U.S. bilateral relations. As the report of an Indo-U.S.
task force on the Indian Ocean argued, “A more mature relationship is developing as India becomes increasingly strong and self-confident in its role as a major
self-reliant power with acknowledged maritime capabilities in the Indian Ocean
region.”91 India long had desired to gain recognition of its primacy in the region,
and U.S. support for a few interventions India conducted in the Seychelles and
Maldives in the late 1980s fulfilled this long-held desire of New Delhi.92
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The formal end of the Cold War greatly facilitated this dynamic. An editorial
in India’s leading English-language daily, the Indian Express, stated in 1992 that
“whether one likes it or not, there is no other country with which India has so
much in common as far as naval perceptions are concerned.”93 Given the absence
of a fundamental conflict of interest between the two countries, New Delhi had
no qualms about once again pursuing a bandwagoning strategy.94 U.S. unipolarity also left no other recourse available to Indian decision makers. India required American support for its economic growth and to realize its fundamental
foreign-policy goals, particularly gaining acceptance as a rising major power in
the international system. The most precise summary describing U.S. unipolarity
and India’s consequent strategy appeared in the report submitted by the highlevel Group of Ministers (GoM) that the Vajpayee government set up in 2000
to review national security. The report, titled “Reforming National Security,”
observed that the “pre-eminence of the USA in political, economic, military and
technological fields is more in evidence today than ever before. Its capabilities to
forge coalitions and alliances and have its way on any issue is [sic] unmatched.
. . . US pre-eminence in the global strategic architecture is unlikely to diminish
in the foreseeable future.”
Therefore, the GoM report, in its recommendations, argued that India should
embrace wholeheartedly a bandwagoning strategy: “Meaningful, broad-based engagement with the United States spanning political, economic and technological
interests and commonalities will impact beneficially on our external security concerns with a resultant albeit less visible impact on our internal security environment. Conversely, an adversarial relationship with that State can have significant
negative repercussions across the same broad range of issues and concerns.”95 If
the issue of India’s nuclear status can be taken as reflective of New Delhi’s ability
to accomplish foreign-policy priorities overall during the first two decades after
the Cold War ended, India still would be an outcast among the world’s global
nuclear powers—if it had not received support from the United States. The inertia
of India’s foreign-policy idealism may have forced it to propagate a vision of a
multipolar world order, but the country’s rise occurred within a unipolar system.
Yet India’s “bandwagoning for gain” strategy was premised on three major
assumptions: the absence of a serious security threat in its neighborhood, the
continuity of an American-centered unipolar world order, and the expectation
of India’s economic rise. In the last decade, all these assumptions have “come a
cropper.”
First, China’s rise as a significant economic and military power located in
India’s immediate neighborhood has created a unique political challenge for
India. For the first time since independence, India has witnessed the rise of a
great power not only located in its immediate vicinity but with which it has
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fundamental conflicts of interest—in particular, the two countries’ unresolved
border disputes.96 The bipolar order of the Cold War was comparatively benign,
not only because India was distant in the maritime realm from both the Soviet
Union and the United States, but also because it had no major disputes with either
of those great powers. The resulting bipolar world order was not a liability but an
asset, insofar as India could rely on one or the other or both of these powers to
protect its interests in the region. Therefore, India desired détente between the
United States and the Soviet Union and strove to support it when possible, as in
the 1960s.97 India’s fallback option was to gain the support of either great power if
the other turned hostile, as when it sided with the Soviet Union in the 1970s.98 Yet
given the distance factor and the lack of physical hostility, India could embrace
unipolarity with equal ease. However, the new bipolar order with China as one of
the two major poles threatens India’s fundamental interests, reduces its strategic
maneuverability, and limits the prospects for its global rise.
Second, a necessary corollary of China’s rise is the relative decline of the United States in global affairs. As China rises, U.S. influence on international politics
wanes correspondingly. As long as the United States was willing to accommodate
India as a rising power, the liberal world order—an anodyne representation of
global rules serving American interests and supported by American power—was
in India’s interests as well.99 China has shown no such regard for India’s place in
the sun, an attitude manifested in Beijing’s reactions to Indian exercise of influence in South Asia and to its membership on the United Nations Security Council or the Nuclear Suppliers Group.100 India remains deeply ambivalent toward
a China-centric Asian or global order. It is becoming highly doubtful that New
Delhi will be able to reach any respectful accommodation with Beijing, whether
on the border issues or on India’s status in the world.
Lastly, the bandwagoning-for-gain strategy assumed that as long as India generated enough economic and military power from within, New Delhi would not
require external support to fulfill its immediate security requirements. Moreover,
if India’s material power increased, other states by necessity could be expected to
accommodate its interests both in the region and across the world. However, the
impressive economic performance that India achieved late in the first decade of
the twenty-first century has been replaced by a mediocre one. India currently is
growing economically, but not at a rate that will enable it to stand up to China on
its own while also impressing the world with its arrival as a power with which to
be reckoned.101
It is these circumstances that have altered India’s approach to the United States.
Previously, gain was the motive; today, the logic for India to increase its strategic
closeness with the United States is the country’s survival, security, and future
position within the Asian and global orders. Balancing China’s rise has become
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India’s foremost foreign-policy priority. And, given the realization that such
balancing may not be achievable through the country’s internal resources alone,
the importance of the United States in India’s strategic calculus has increased
significantly.
This external balancing strategy is evident, first and foremost, in the growth
of Indo-U.S. military relations. In the last decade of the twentieth century and
the first of the twenty-first, the defense aspect of the relationship with the United
States helped deepen the two countries’ bilateral ties overall and build India’s trust
therein. Still, India’s primary motivation was to gain U.S. support for its foreignpolicy goals in general rather than to respond to a specific threat. However, in the
last decade the tone and tenor of the Indo-U.S. military relationship have been
driven by India’s insecurity vis-à-vis China. Not only is the bulk of the defense
equipment India has purchased from the United States being employed in deterring India’s northern neighbor, but the enthusiasm with which India has signed
the foundational defense agreements with the United States over the last five
years is evidence enough that it seeks greater assistance in upgrading its military
capabilities.102 These foundational agreements have helped India fill some major
gaps in its military preparedness, particularly its surveillance of, as well as its acquisition of other intelligence concerning, Chinese military capabilities along the
Himalayan frontier and throughout the Indian Ocean region.103 Although these
developments escape the classic definition of external balancing, which may be
considered to require explicit military commitments between allies, the objective
of India’s interest in pursuing a robust military relationship with the United States
has changed fundamentally, from being merely an instrument to achieve a greater
bilateral partnership to becoming an essential component of India’s deterrent
strategy vis-à-vis China. Skepticism regarding the Indo-U.S. military relationship
often touches on the remote possibility of India ever signing a security treaty with
the United States and of American soldiers ever fighting on Indian soil. However,
a more formal security partnership cannot be dismissed a priori. Given the nature of India’s security requirements, New Delhi’s foreign-policy practice suggests
that it has used formal security pacts—for example, the 1971 Treaty of Friendship
with the Soviet Union—to signal deterrence to its adversaries.104 The process of
moving toward a formalization of the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership continues
to unfold, adding to India’s internal capabilities to deter China and producing a
“force in being” that could be employed in the service of India’s interests in the
future. Much of the course of this continuing dynamic will depend on China’s
assertiveness and how ably India could cope with any Chinese military pressure
on its own.
The second evidence of India’s shift away from a bandwagoning-for-gain strategy to an external-balancing-for-security strategy is the increasing intensity of its
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/5

22

Joshi: The Imperative of Political Navigation—India’s Strategy in the In

JOSHI

59

support for the Quad. India’s approach to the Quad again can be classified into
two distinct periods: the pre-2007 and the post-2017 phases. In the face of China’s
discomfort and ire in response to Exercise MALABAR-2007, India readily folded
the tents of its support for the Quad, because it viewed the grouping primarily as
an instrument of gain rather than of survival. The Quad offered an opportunity
to extend Indo-U.S. relations; build relations with otherwise estranged maritime
democracies, such as Japan and Australia; and increase India’s status and raise its
profile in the region. However, the balance of India’s interests dictated that if the
Quad became an obstacle in the country’s quest to reach an accommodation with
China, New Delhi should abandon the concept with no qualms.105
But over the course of the Quad’s dormant decade, the manifest changes in
Beijing’s power, interests, and conduct were sufficient for New Delhi to revise its
approach to operationalizing a local balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. India’s
halting economic progress during that period only underlined the country’s need
for external assistance in countering China’s diplomatic, economic, and military
assertiveness in India’s back yard. China’s conduct in Galwan was the last straw.
At present, in light of the June 2020 Sino-Indian border crisis, any hope of reaching a separate peace or accommodation with China appears forlorn.106
The resurgence of the Quad in India’s strategy therefore is linked to its balancing requirements. Technological and resource cooperation with Quad countries
may assist India in challenging China’s monopoly on global supply chains, 5G
infrastructure, and rare earths.107 Militarily, the Quad not only helps to augment
India’s military capabilities and efficiency but—like bilateral Indo-U.S. military
cooperation—also signals the formation of a force in being that may prove useful
at a later date. If the Quad navies have achieved the capability “to plug and play”
in the Indo-Pacific, as the Indian navy chief argued in July 2020, the Indo-Pacific
naval entente surely is going to make heads turn in Beijing.108
The third indicator of India’s embrace of external balancing is its shifting policy
regarding the role of the United States and its allies in South Asian and Indian
Ocean region affairs.109 For the first time in its history, India is welcoming enthusiastically a greater American presence in the subcontinent and the northern Indian
Ocean region.110 Perhaps no other state in the region was hurt more by the U.S.
military withdrawal from Afghanistan than India.111 India also was instrumental
in brokering a defense pact between the United States and the Maldives. Signed
in September 2020, the Framework for U.S. Department of Defense–Maldives
Ministry of Defence Defense and Security Relationship would not have come
about without New Delhi’s active encouragement, given the close strategic ties
between New Delhi and Male.112 In contrast, back in 2013 India was instrumental
in scuttling a “status of forces” agreement between the Maldives and the United
States.113 During the recent negotiating process, both Male and Washington kept
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New Delhi constantly engaged, to the extent that the draft agreement was shown
to Indian leadership before it was signed. Similarly, India has encouraged greater
military cooperation between the United States and its allies, such as Japan and
Australia, and other South Asian states.114 American allies, particularly Japan and
Australia, also have become central to India’s anti-China diplomacy in the South
Asian region. Japan and India have collaborated to compete with China for major
infrastructure projects, such as the West Container Terminal project in Colombo,
Sri Lanka, and the Dhaka Metro Rail project in Bangladesh.115 Australia also
launched the South Asia Regional Infrastructure Connectivity Project (known as
SARIC) in 2019, with India as a critical partner.116 India’s volte-face on a greater
U.S. role in what it previously had considered to be its traditional sphere of influence is driven directly by, as one senior Indian official stated, the “imperative not
to provide space to China here.”117
The reality of Indo-U.S. relations is simple. In the current geopolitical environment, India needs the United States much more than the reverse.118 Given
India’s strategic vulnerabilities, New Delhi needs to focus its attention firmly on
Beijing. If that requires ignoring a few American inanities, it is definitely worth
the benefits. P. N. Haksar, Indira Gandhi’s principal secretary, once advised her
that foreign relations are a “balance sheet of credits and debits.”119 Even with the
Seventh Fleet’s April 2021 FONOP falling on the debit side, overall Indo-U.S.
relations remain hugely beneficial to India.
This article has explicated the discrepancy between the expectations of India’s
strategic community and the country’s foreign and national-security policies in
practice, concerning the Indian Ocean, the presence of great powers in the region, and the role of Indo-U.S. relations in India’s geopolitical strategy. It argues
that many students of Indian foreign policy have been overly idealistic, legalistic,
and principled when it comes to understanding India’s strategic behavior. In
practice, India’s foreign-policy mandarins seldom have been impelled by public
pronouncements, legal obligations, or rhetorical principles. The article’s analysis
underlines the strength of the realpolitik tradition in Indian foreign policy and
the capacity of successive Indian governments to pursue their interests even under severe material constraints by deploying tools of diplomacy and international
law. Marshaling recently declassified documents from Indian archives, it reveals
how Indian decision makers used the presence of great powers in the Indian
Ocean to fulfill their country’s security requirements, adroitly shifting from one
balancing coalition to another according to the geopolitical situation. It also lays
bare the political underpinnings of India’s engagement with international law,
particularly the law of the sea, and the enactment and implementation of domestic law concerning the country’s maritime responsibilities. India seldom has
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/5
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allowed the law to determine its political behavior; instead, its national interests
define its negotiating behavior in legal forums, the scope of the laws it pursues
or enacts, and the laws’ application within India’s maritime sphere of influence.
Lastly, the article highlights the logic of India’s stronger emphasis on its strategic
partnership with the United States as it confronts the peril of China’s ascendance
as a great power in Asia.
Without an appreciation of the history of India’s strategic behavior and the
pressing reality of India’s strategic requirements in the contemporary age of greatpower politics, students of Indian foreign policy always will remain a couple of
steps behind the curve in understanding the substantive reality of the Indo-U.S.
relationship.
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